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                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ___________ 
                                 
                          NO. 95-5505 
                          ___________  
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
   v. 
 
CDMG REALTY CO., a limited partnership; HELEN E. RINGLIEB, 
individually, and as general partner in CDMG REALTY CO.; 
HMAT ASSOCIATES, INC.; TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS; 
ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC; BEAZER MATERIALS & SERVICES, INC.; 
CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION; HOECHST CELANESE CORP.; OCCIDENTAL 
CHEMICAL CORP.; PFIZER, INC.; CARL GULICK, INC.; BECTON 
DICKINSON, INC.; WARNER-LAMBERT COMPANY; AMERICAN TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY; BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF NORTH 
JERSEY, INC.; INDUSTRIAL CIRCUITS COMPANY; AUTOMATIC SWITCH 
COMPANY; ROWE INTERNATIONAL INC.; HOSOKAWA MICRON INTERNATIONAL 
INC.; SCOVILL INC.; K-H CORPORATION ON BEHALF OF MAGOR CAR; 
LESLIE CONTROLS COMPANY, INC.; NESOR ALLOY CORPORATION; SANDOZ 
PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION; KIDDE INDUSTRIES, INC. (named 
in the complaint as Hanson Industries); RAYONIER INC., 
(formerly ITT Rayonier, Inc.); WAGNER ELECTRIC CORPORATION 
(named in the Complaint as Cooper Industries, Inc.); THE 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY; KDI/TRIANGLE ELECTRONICS, INC.; 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; JOHN DUSENBURY 
COMPANY; SAFETY LIGHT CORPORATION, (named in the Complaint as USR 
Industries, Inc.); THE BOC GROUP, INC.; L.E. CARPENTER & CO.; 
THE MENNEN COMPANY; METEM CORPORATION; NSK CORPORATION; CERAMIC 
MAGNETICS, INC.; AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS, INC.; ROCKLAND 
CORPORATION; SIKA CORPORATION; CARBONE USA CORPORATION; 
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION; NEW JERSEY BUS OPERATIONS, INC. 
 
   v. 
 
THE SHARKEY LANDFILL AGREEMENT GROUP, an organization of 
Defendants in Civil Action Number 89-4246 (NHP), for 
themselves and on behalf of other Settling Defendants whose 
contribution claims they may assert pursuant to an 
assignment of rights and HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION, one of 
its members; BEAZER MATERIALS & SERVICES, INC.; OCCIDENTAL 
CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION; HMAT ASSOCIATES, INC., 
 
                                        Third-Party Plaintiffs 
   v. 
 
ADRON, INC.; AMERACE CORPORATION and SEQUA CORPORATION;  
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS, INC.; BASIC, INC.; THE BOC GROUP, INC.; 
CARBONE U.S.A. CORP.; CERAMIC MAGNETICS, INC.; COLLOID CHEMICAL, 
INC.; COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC.; HANSON INDUSTRIES; INTERNATIONAL 
ENGRAVING CORP.; INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY; ITT RAYONIER, INC.; 
JOHN DUSENBURY COMPANY, INC.; KDI/TRIANGLE ELECTRONICS INC.;  
L.E. CARPENTER & CO.; LITTON SYSTEMS, INC.;  
THE MENNEN COMPANY; METEM CORPORATION;  
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION; NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS COMPANY, 
INC.; NSK CORPORATION; OLD DEERFIELD FABRICS, INC.; 
PANTASOTE INC.; PQ CORPORATION; PRECISION MANUFACTURING CO., INC; 
ROCKLAND CORPORATION; SANDOZ PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION; THE 
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY; SIKA CORPORATION; USR INDUSTRIES, INC. 
and TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD; TOWN OF BOONTON; TOWNSHIP OF BOONTON; 
BOROUGH OF BUTLER; TOWNSHIP OF THE BOROUGH OF CALDWELL;  
TOWNSHIP OF CHATHAM; CITY OF CLIFTON; TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE;  
TOWN OF DOVER; TOWNSHIP OF EAST HANOVER; COUNTY OF ESSEX; 
TOWNSHIP OF FAIRFIELD; TOWNSHIP OF GLEN RIDGE BOROUGH;  
BOROUGH OF HALEDON; TOWNSHIP OF HANOVER; CITY OF JERSEY CITY; 
BOROUGH OF KINNELON; BOROUGH OF LINCOLN PARK; 
TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE FALLS; TOWNSHIP OF LIVINGSTON; TOWNSHIP 
OF MILLBURN; TOWNSHIP OF MINE HILL; TOWNSHIP OF MONTCLAIR; 
TOWNSHIP OF MONTVILLE; TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS; TOWN OF MORRISTOWN; 
BOROUGH OF MOUNTAIN LAKES; TOWNSHIP OF PEQUAMNOCK; BOROUGH OF 
POMPTON LAKES; BOROUGH OF PROSPECT PARK; TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH; 
BOROUGH OF RIVERDALE; TOWNSHIP OF ROCKAWAY; CITY OF SUMMIT; 
BOROUGH OF TOTOWA; BOROUGH OF VICTORY GARDENS; TOWNSHIP OF WEST 
CALDWELL; TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE; BOROUGH OF WHARTON; VINCENT 
APICE AND SON; FRANK M. BACE DISPOSAL, INC.; CALDWELL TRUCKING 
CO., INC.; CARNER BROS., INC.; CENTRAL WASTE AND MILL SERVICE, 
INC.; CHATHAM DISPOSAL COMPANY; CHEM-QUID DISPOSAL, INC.;  
CARMEL CHIULLO; JOHN COSTA; JOSEPH DEFRIETAS; DELL & SONS; 
DENVILLE DISPOSAL CO., INC.; DIMARCO SANITATION; SAM FIORENZO; 
FRANK'S SANITATION SERVICE; GARBCO ASSOCIATES, INC.; B. HORSTMANN 
SEPTIC TANK SERVICE; DANIEL JACKSON; J.M.S. SANITATION CO.;  
R. LOBOSCO AND SONS, INC.; MARANGI SANITATION, INC.;  
FRANK J. MARINARO; MERCER WASTE REMOVAL CO.;  
ANTHONY MIELE; MORRIS COUNTY; WEST ESSEX DISPOSAL CO., INC.; 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;  
HELEN ELAINE RINGLIEB and TOWNSHIP OF ESSEX FELLS;  
HARDING TOWNSHIP; MADISON BOROUGH;  
BOROUGH OF NEW PROVIDENCE; ROSELAND BOROUGH; UNION COUNTY;  
WAYNE TOWNSHIP; DOWEL ASSOCIATES, a general partnership;  
HERBERT M. IRIS, individually and as a general partner in DOWEL 
ASSOCIATES; LESTE Z. LIEBERMAN, individually and as general 
partner in DOWEL ASSOCIATES,  
                                        Third-Party Defendants 
 
(Newark N.J. D.C. Civil No. 89-cv-04246) 
 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
   v. 
 
 
CIBA-GEIGY CORPORATION, INC.; CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION; 
HOECHST-CELANESE CORPORATION; KETCHAM AND MC DOUGALL, INC.; 
PFIZER, INC.; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION; KOPPERS 
COMPANY, INC.; SHARKEY FARMS, INC.; NICHOLAS ENTERPRISES, 
INC.; PARKER CHEMICAL COMPANY; CHEMICAL WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. 
 
(NEWARK N.J. D.C. Civil No. 89-cv-04281) 
 
                HMAT Associates, Inc., Appellant 
           _________________________________________ 
                                 
        On Appeal From the United States District Court 
                 For the District of New Jersey 
           _________________________________________ 
                                 
                     Argued: March 18, 1996 
                                 
Before:  BECKER, McKEE, and McKAY,  
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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                    _________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
     This appeal requires us to determine the meaning of the word 
"disposal" in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et 
seq.  Plaintiff HMAT Associates, the current owner of 
contaminated property, was sued by the United States under CERCLA 
for the costs of cleaning up the site.  HMAT sought contribution 
from Defendant Dowel Associates, the company that sold the land 
to HMAT, on the ground that Dowel was a prior owner "at the time 
of disposal," see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).  HMAT concedes that no 
one dumped waste at the property during Dowel's ownership, but 
offers two reasons why "disposal" took place during Dowel's 
tenure.  HMAT first advances a "passive" disposal theory:  that 
"disposal" occurred because contamination dumped in the land 
prior to Dowel's purchase of the property spread during Dowel's 
ownership.  HMAT also offers an "active" disposal theory:  that a 
soil investigation conducted by Dowel to determine whether the 
land could support construction caused the dispersal of 
contaminants, and that this constitutes "disposal." 
     On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 
ruled in favor of Dowel.  The court rejected HMAT's argument that 
the spread of contamination unaided by human conduct can confer 
CERCLA liability and held that any disturbance of contaminants 
caused by Dowel's soil testing was too insignificant to amount to 
"disposal."  HMAT appeals the court's grant of Dowel's summary 
judgment motion and the denial of its own motion. 
     We hold that the passive migration of contamination dumped 
in the land prior to Dowel's ownership does not constitute 
disposal.  Finding it unnecessary to reach the question whether 
the movement of contaminants unaided by human conduct can ever 
constitute "disposal," we conclude that the language of CERCLA's 
"disposal" definition cannot encompass the spreading of waste at 
issue here.  This conclusion is based on an examination of 
CERCLA's text, is supported by the structure of the statute, and 
is consistent with CERCLA's purposes.   
     Regarding Dowel's soil testing, we hold that there is no 
threshold level of disturbance required to constitute "disposal," 
and that HMAT has identified evidence that would justify a 
factfinder's conclusion that contaminants were spread in the 
testing.  We also hold, however, that because CERCLA clearly 
contemplates that prospective purchasers be allowed to conduct 
soil investigations to determine whether property is 
contaminated, a plaintiff must show not only that a soil 
investigation has caused the spread of contaminants, but also 
that the investigation was conducted negligently. 
     Thus, although we agree with the district court that HMAT's 
passive theory is not viable, HMAT may be able to proceed on its 
active theory.  Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to Dowel and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                 I. Facts and Procedural History 
     The property at issue in this case, a ten-acre parcel of 
land in Morris County, New Jersey, was once part of the Sharkey's 
Farm Landfill (Sharkey's Landfill).  Sharkey's Landfill operated 
as a municipal landfill from 1945 until 1972.  During its 
operation, the landfill received waste from several counties in 
northern New Jersey.  In addition to accepting municipal solid 
waste, the landfill received approximately 750,000 pounds of 
hazardous chemical waste from Ciba-Geigy Company, a large 
pharmaceutical concern.  Additional chemical waste from other 
sources may also have been deposited there.  For example, Koppers 
Chemical Company allegedly disposed of about 3,000,000 gallons of 
wastewater of unknown composition in the landfill.  Between 1966 
and 1972, county and state agencies received steady complaints 
about odors, smoke from fires, lack of proper cover, and the 
presence of dead animals in the landfill.  The landfill was 
closed to further disposal in 1972. 
     The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (NJDEPE) began 
investigating Sharkey's Landfill in the mid to late 1970s.  In 
1982, the EPA placed Sharkey's Landfill on the National 
Priorities List of Hazardous Waste Sites. 
     In December 1981, Dowel purchased the property.  The land 
was vacant at the time of purchase, and it remained vacant during 
Dowel's ownership.  Neither Dowel nor any other person deposited 
waste at the site during Dowel's term of ownership.  Dowel's only 
activity on the land was a soil investigation, conducted in 
September 1981 (three months prior to finalizing its purchase) to 
determine the land's ability to support construction.  The soil 
investigation, which was performed by Thor Engineering, involved 
nine drill borings, each twelve to eighteen feet into the ground.  
Thor's logs show that its equipment bored through various waste 
materials and groundwater and that several of the boreholes 
"caved" during the testing.  App. 120. 
     In November 1983, the NJDEPE notified Dowel that it was 
investigating the property and that Dowel should cease any 
planned activities at the site.  In 1984, the EPA notified Dowel 
that Dowel was potentially liable for the cleanup costs of the 
site and invited it to undertake voluntary cleanup.  App. 273. 
     In 1987, Dowel sold the property to HMAT.  In the contract 
of sale, Dowel fully disclosed that the property was part of the 
Sharkey Landfill, that the landfill was under investigation by 
state and federal environmental authorities, and that the 
property was part of a possible Superfund site.  App. 282. 
     In October 1989, EPA and NJDEPE commenced actions against 
parties potentially liable for the costs of cleaning up the 
Sharkey Landfill and seeking a declaration of future liability.  
HMAT, as the current owner of the property, was named as a 
defendant under CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).  
Dowel was not sued.  However, HMAT filed a third-party suit 
against Dowel, seeking contribution from Dowel as a former owner 
of the property "at the time of disposal" pursuant to CERCLA §§ 
107(a)(2) and 113(f).  HMAT also pled state law claims. 
     Dowel moved for summary judgment, arguing that under CERCLA, 
prior owners are only liable if they actively engage in waste 
disposal during their ownership of the property.  HMAT also moved 
for summary judgment.  HMAT challenged Dowel's reading of CERCLA, 
contending that prior owners are liable if they fail to stop the 
migration of contaminants on their property.  In addition, HMAT 
argued that Dowel actively engaged in waste disposal within the 
meaning of CERCLA:  HMAT submitted an affidavit from Laura 
Truettner, an expert environmental consultant, which asserted 
that Dowel's drill borings exacerbated contamination by mixing, 
shifting, and spreading waste materials.  In response, Dowel 
submitted an affidavit from Peter Wilner, the principal of Thor 
Engineering, stating that the boring did not spread or mix any 
materials.  HMAT then submitted another affidavit from Truettner, 
which contended that Wilner's affidavit contains misleading 
statements and directly contradicts the contemporaneous record of 
the drilling. 
     As we have noted, the district court granted Dowel's motion 
in full and denied HMAT's cross-motion.  The court reasoned that 
mere ownership of previously contaminated property does not 
trigger liability under CERCLA, and that, even accepting HMAT's 
version of the facts, Dowel's drilling activities did not cause a 
significant enough disturbance to trigger liability.  HMAT 
appeals the district court's rulings on its CERCLA claims 
(although it accepts the district court's conclusion that Dowel 
is not liable under state law).  We exercise plenary review over 
the district court's summary judgment rulings.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Capital Blue Cross, 992 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (3d Cir. 
1993).    
 
         II. Passive Spreading in a Landfill as Disposal  
                         A. Introduction 
     CERCLA is a broad and complex statute aimed at the dangers 
posed by hazardous waste sites.  Among other things, CERCLA 
provides a cause of action to recover "response costs" incurred 
in remedying an environmental hazard, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, and 
allows those liable for response costs to seek contribution from 
other liable parties, id. § 9613(f).  A plaintiff must meet four 
elements to establish CERCLA liability:  (1) that hazardous 
substances were disposed of at a "facility"; (2) that there has 
been a "release" or "threatened release" of hazardous substances 
from the facility into the environment; (3) that the release or 
threatened release has required or will require the expenditure 
of "response costs"; and (4) that the defendant falls within one 
of four categories of responsible parties.  Id. § 9607(a); seeUnited 
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d 
Cir.), reh'g and reh'g in banc denied, 964 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 
1992).  If these requirements are met, responsible parties are 
liable for response costs regardless of their intent.  See id. at 
259 ("CERCLA imposes strict liability on responsible parties."). 
     The parties agree that the first three requirements are met.  
Their dispute concerns whether Dowel is a responsible party.  
CERCLA makes four classes of people liable for response costs or 
contribution:  the current owner or operator of a facility, id. § 
9607(a)(1); any person who owned or operated the facility "at the 
time of disposal" of a hazardous substance, id. § 9607(a)(2); any 
person who arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged for 
transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at 
the facility, § 9607(a)(3); and any person who accepts or 
accepted hazardous substances for transport to sites selected by 
such person, Id. § 9607(a)(4).  HMAT contends that Dowel is 
liable as a person who owned or operated the facility "at the 
time of disposal" of a hazardous substance. 
     CERCLA defines "disposal" by incorporating the definition 
used by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  See42 U.S.C. § 
9601(29) ("The terms 'disposal', 'hazardous waste', 
and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.").  Under RCRA, 
     The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, 
     injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of 
     any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land 
     or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or 
     any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be 
     emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, 
     including ground waters. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).  Focusing on the breadth of this definition, 
HMAT reads "disposal" to encompass the passive migration of 
contaminants.  HMAT offers no evidence that any passive migration 
has occurred here but asks us to take judicial notice that waste 
tends to spread once it is put in the ground, See Office of 
Remedial Response, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Superfund Exposure Assessment Manual 8 (1988) [Hereinafter 
Superfund Manual] (waste in landfills tends to migrate due to, 
inter alia, rain, groundwater movement, and wind) and waste 
therefore must have spread during the six years Dowel owned the 
property.  Several courts have been sympathetic to this argument.  
See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 
(4th Cir. 1984) (migration of hazardous substances can constitute 
disposal under RCRA); CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General 
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (the unchecked 
spread of contaminated groundwater qualifies as disposal under 
CERCLA); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 
662-64 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (ongoing migration of hazardous 
substances constitutes disposal under CERCLA); United States v. 
Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981) (spreading of 
hazardous substances constitutes disposal under RCRA), aff'd, 688 
F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & 
Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th Cir.) (leaking from tanks 
that were deposited prior to the defendants' ownership 
constitutes disposal subjecting the defendant to CERCLA 
liability), cert. denied sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 
940 (1992); State of New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 
668, 676-77 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (gradual leaking from drums deposited 
prior to the defendants' ownership constitutes disposal under 
CERCLA); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 382 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (leaking drums constitute CERCLA 
disposal), aff'd, 126 B.R. 650 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1992). 
     We are unpersuaded.  A thorough examination of the text and 
structure of CERCLA convinces us that the passive migration of 
contaminants alleged here does not constitute disposal.  Our 
conclusion is based on the plain meaning of the words used in the 
disposal definition and is supported by the structure of CERCLA's 
liability scheme.  We also believe that our interpretation is 
consistent with CERCLA's purposes. 
 
                         B. The Language 
                 1. The Definition of "Disposal" 
     The definition of disposal begins with "the discharge, 
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any 
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water."  42 
U.S.C. § 6903(3).  Courts holding that passive migration can 
constitute disposal have focused on the words "leaking" and 
"spilling," terms that generally do not denote active conduct.  
See CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. 
Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D. Mich. 1991); United States v. Price, 523 
F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
     We think there is a strong argument, however, that in the 
context of this definition, "leaking" and "spilling" should be 
read to require affirmative human action.  Both "leaking" and 
"spilling" also have meanings that require some active human 
conduct.  "Leak" can be defined as "to permit to enter or escape 
through a leak."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
Unabridged 1285 (Philip Babcock Gove & the Mirriam-Webster 
Editorial Staff eds., 1986) [hereinafter Webster's].  Similarly, 
"spill" can mean "to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall 
out."  Id. at 2195.  Meaning derives from context, hence the 
constructional canon noscitur a sociis, which states that one may 
infer meaning by examining the surrounding words.  The words 
surrounding "leaking" and "spilling" -- "discharge," "deposit," 
"injection," "dumping," and "placing" -- all envision a human 
actor.  In the context of these other words, then, Congress may 
have intended active meanings of "leaking" and "spilling."  SeeEcodyne 
Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1989); 
Robert L. Bronston, Note, The Case Against Intermediate Owner 
Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste, 93 Mich. L. 
Rev. 609, 616 (1994). 
     But we need not address this question in the broad terms of 
whether disposal always requires active human conduct.  Even if 
it does not, we conclude that the passive migration at issue in 
this case cannot constitute disposal.  While "leaking" and 
"spilling" may not require affirmative human conduct, neither 
word denotes the gradual spreading of contamination alleged here.  
A common definition of "leak" -- and the one most favorable to 
HMAT -- is "to enter or escape through a hole, crevice, or other 
opening."  Webster's, supra at 1285.  This definition requires 
that a substance "leak" from some opening.  For example, the 
definition would encompass the escape of waste through a hole in 
a drum.  But HMAT has offered no evidence of leaking drums.  
Compare, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 
F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir.) (the plaintiff presented evidence 
showing that tanks had leaked), cert. denied sub nom. Mumaw v. 
Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 940 (1992).  And there is no other evidence 
that waste escaped from any opening during Dowel's ownership. 
     The definition of "spilling" is also unavailing.  Although 
"spilling" too sometimes denotes the movement of liquid in the 
absence of human action, such a definition does not cover the 
spreading of waste at issue here.  Passive definitions of "spill" 
suggest a rapid torrent, not gradual passive migration over the 
course of several years.  See Webster's, supra at 2195 (defining 
"spill" as, inter alia, "to flow, run, or fall out, over, or off 
with waste, loss, or scattering as the result" and as "to come, 
go, or pass with a turbulent rush[; to] pour in an unrestrained, 
profuse, or disorderly manner").  Consider, for example, an "oil 
spill." 
                   2. A Comparison With "Release" 
     It is especially unjustified to stretch the meanings of 
"leaking" and "spilling" to encompass the passive migration that 
generally occurs in landfills in view of the fact that another 
word used in CERCLA, "release," shows that Congress knew 
precisely how to refer to this spreading of waste.  A prior owner 
who owned a waste site at the time of "disposal" is only liable 
in the event of a "release" or "threatened release."  42 U.S.C. § 
9607.  CERCLA defines release in relevant part as follows: 
     The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, 
     pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, 
     injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
     into the environment (including the abandonment or 
     discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed 
     receptacles containing any hazardous substance or 
     pollutant or contaminant) . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).  The definition of "release" is thus 
broader than that of "disposal":  "release" encompasses 
"disposing" and some elements of the "disposal" definition and 
also includes some additional terms. 
     Most importantly, the definition of "release" includes the 
term "leaching," which is not mentioned in the definition of 
"disposal."  "Leaching" is "the process or an instance of 
separating the soluble components from some material by 
percolation."  Webster's, supra at 1282.  Leaching of 
contaminants from rain and groundwater movement is a principal 
cause of contaminant movement in landfills, see Superfund Manual, 
supra at 8, and is the most predominant cause of groundwater 
contamination from landfills, Edward Repa & Charles Kufs, 
Leachate Plume Management 2 (1985).  The word "leaching" is 
commonly used in the environmental context to describe this 
migration of contaminants.  See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, The Toxic 
Time Bomb:  Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous 
Waste, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 197, 207 n.34 (1988) ("Leachate is 
liquid or water soluble contaminated substances that migrate away 
from the point source of contamination in groundwater or surface 
water, often influenced by rain and normal water table 
activities.  Such a phenomenon is described as 'leaching' of 
contaminants.")  Congress's use of the term "leaching" in the 
definition of "release" demonstrates that it was aware of the 
concept of passive migration in landfills and that it knew how to 
explicitly refer to that concept. 
 
  .    Yet Congress made prior owners liable only if they owned 
land at the time of "disposal," not at the time of "release." 
 
                   3. "At the Time of Disposal" 
     Our conclusion that the meaning of the words in the 
"disposal" definition cannot cover the passive migration alleged 
in this case is buttressed by the language of CERCLA's liability 
provision.  If the spreading of contaminants is constant, as HMAT 
would have us assume, characterizing liable parties as "any 
person who at the time of disposal . . . owned or operated any 
facility," 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), would be a rather complicated 
way of making liable all people who owned or operated a facility 
after the introduction of waste into the facility.  See Snediker 
Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984, 989 (E.D. 
Mich. 1991); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D. 
Cal. 1989); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).  Furthermore, there would be no need 
for the separate responsible party category of current owner or 
operator, id. § 9607(a)(1).  See Ecodyne Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 
1457.  Although CERCLA is not written with great clarity, we 
will not impute to Congress an intent to set up a simple 
liability scheme through a convoluted methodology.      
 
                C. Structure:  The Innocent Owner Defense 
     Our conclusion that the language of CERCLA's definition of 
"disposal" does not include the passive migration alleged here is 
also supported by a significant aspect of CERCLA's liability 
scheme, the innocent owner defense.  Since the 1986 Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675), 
CERCLA has exempted certain "innocent owners" from liability. 
     CERCLA provides a defense to liability if the defendant can 
prove that the release or threatened release was caused solely by 
an act or omission of a third party.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).  
The defense is generally not available if the third party causing 
the release is in the chain of title with the defendant.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).  However, the defense is available in such 
circumstances if the person claiming the defense is an "innocent 
owner."  To establish the innocent owner defense the defendant 
must show that "the real property on which the facility is 
located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or 
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility" 
and that "[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the 
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any 
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or 
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility."  
     Because CERCLA conditions the innocent owner defense on the 
defendant's having purchased the property "after the disposal" of 
hazardous waste at the property, "disposal" cannot constitute the 
allegedly constant spreading of contaminants.  Otherwise, the 
defense would almost never apply, as there would generally be no 
point "after disposal."  See United States v. Petersen Sand and 
Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351-52 (N.D. Ill. 1992); In re 
Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 115 B.R. 559, 566 
n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990); Bronston, supra at 627-28.  We 
think it unlikely that Congress would create a basically useless 
defense. 
     The innocent owner defense's apparent limitation to current 
owners also supports the conclusion that "disposal" does not 
encompass the passive spreading alleged here.  The provision 
establishing the innocent owner defense states:  "Nothing in this 
paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title [, which 
provides the causation defenses including the third party 
defense,] shall diminish the liability of any previous owner or 
operator who would be otherwise liable under this chapter."  42 
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).  This language certainly suggests that the 
innocent owner defense is unavailable to prior owners or 
operators. 
     While the question whether the innocent owner defense is 
available only to present owners is not before us -- and we do 
not decide the issue -- we note that such a limitation makes 
sense only if passive spreading of waste in a landfill is not 
included in disposal.  If passive migration is excluded from 
"disposal," past owners will generally only be liable as owners 
"at the time of disposal" when they have committed or allowed 
affirmative acts of disposal on their property.  They would thus 
have little need for the innocent owner defense, which requires, 
inter alia, that a defendant did not "cause[] or contribute[] to 
the release or threatened release," 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(D); 
"exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance 
concerned," id. § 9607(b)(3)(a); and "took precautions against 
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party [causing 
the release] and the consequences that could foreseeably result 
from such acts or omissions," id. § 9607(b)(3)(b).  On the other 
hand, if prior owners were liable because waste spread during 
their tenure and the innocent owner defense is available only to 
current owners, prior owners would be in a significantly worse 
position than current owners:  they would be liable for passive 
migration of waste even if they had no reason to know of the 
waste's presence.  We do not believe that this was Congress's 
intent. 
 
                       D. CERCLA's Purposes 
     We have explained our confidence that the meaning of the 
words defining "disposal" does not encompass the gradual 
spreading of waste in a landfill and that this conclusion is 
supported by the structure of the innocent owner defense.  We 
also conclude that this reading of "disposal" is consistent with 
CERCLA's purposes. 
     Congress enacted CERCLA with two principal goals in minds -- 
to facilitate the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous 
waste sites, Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 
1994), and to force polluters to pay the costs associated with 
their pollution, United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d 252, 
257-58 (3d Cir. 1992).  See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 
811, 814 (3d Cir. 1995).  Our holding is clearly consistent with 
the latter purpose.  Those who owned previously contaminated 
property where waste spread without their aid cannot reasonably 
be characterized as "polluters"; excluding them from liability 
will not let those who cause the pollution off the hook.  And, 
many of these owners will pay for the pollution:  if they 
disclose the fact that the land contains waste, their selling 
price will reflect the cost of CERCLA liability.  If they have 
knowledge of contamination and do not disclose it to a 
transferee, they are liable for response costs even after the 
transfer.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C).  The only prior owners who 
will not pay any cleanup costs are those who bought and sold the 
land with no knowledge that the land is contaminated. 
     And our holding will not undermine the goal of facilitating 
the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites.  Even 
if owners of previously contaminated land can evade liability by 
transferring the land, ample incentives remain to promote 
cleanup.  See United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 
806 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Bronston, supra at 637- 
40.  Present owners and operators remain strictly liable for 
the costs of cleanup, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), as do some prior 
owners, id. § 9607(a)(2), people who arranged for disposal, id. § 
9607(a)(3), and transporters of hazardous substances, id. § 
9607(a)(4).  Moreover, a number of provisions ensure that 
contamination will be discovered and the fact of contamination 
disclosed if the land is transferred.  CERCLA imposes criminal 
liability (including prison sentences) for failure to report a 
"release" of hazardous substances above a certain threshold.  See42 U.S.C. 
§ 9603.  As mentioned, if an owner transfers land that 
it knows to be contaminated without disclosing the contamination, 
it remains liable even after the transfer.  42 U.S.C. § 
9601(35)(C).  In addition, the innocent owner defense encourages 
potential buyers to investigate the possibility of contamination 
before a purchase.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (in order to 
claim the innocent owner defense, a defendant must have 
undertaken all appropriate inquiry). 
     Thus, for the reasons we have stated, we agree with the 
district court that HMAT cannot proceed on its "passive" theory 
of disposal:  the movement of contaminants alleged here does not 
constitute "disposal."  However, because we conclude that HMAT 
may proceed on its "active" theory of disposal, the issue to 
which we now turn, we will vacate the court's order granting 
summary judgment to Dowel on HMAT's CERCLA claim.  
 
               III. Soil Investigation as Disposal 
     Having concluded that passive migration does not constitute 
disposal, we now consider HMAT's other asserted basis of 
liability.  HMAT argues that Dowel's soil investigation, which 
was meant to determine the land's ability to support 
construction, caused the mixing, shifting, and spreading of 
contaminants and that this constitutes disposal.  Although the 
district court suggested that HMAT's evidence of spreading was 
"speculative," it did not resolve whether the evidence was 
sufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude that the drilling 
caused any subsurface mixing.  Instead, the court concluded that 
even accepting HMAT's version of events, Dowel's drilling "fell 
short of that conduct accepted as being enough of a disturbance 
to constitute disposal."  According to the district court, only 
"significant disturbance of already contaminated soil constitutes 
disposal." 
 
                   A. No Threshold to Disposal 
     We disagree with the district court's reading of "disposal."  
Under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), "disposal" is defined in part as the 
"discharge" or "placing" of waste "into or on any land or water."  
"Disposal" thus includes not only the initial introduction of 
contaminants onto a property but also the spreading of 
contaminants due to subsequent activity.  See Webster's, supra at 
644 (defining "discharge" in part as "to set at liberty," 
"release from confinement, custody, or care," "pour forth," or 
"emit"); id. at 1727 (defining "place" in part as "cause to rest 
or lie"); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus 
Development Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1992) 
("CERCLA's definition of 'disposal' expressly encompasses the 
'placing of any . . . hazardous waste . . . on any land.'  42 
U.S.C. § 6903(3).  Congress did not limit the term to the initial 
introduction of hazardous material onto property."); Tanglewood 
East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th 
Cir. 1988) ("[T]his definition of disposal does not limit 
disposal to a one-time occurrence -- there may be other disposals 
when hazardous substances are moved, dispersed, or released 
during landfill excavations and fillings."). 
     Although the cases cited above involved a greater 
disturbance of contaminants than that alleged here, the dispersal 
of contaminants need not reach a particular threshold level in 
order to constitute "disposal."  "Disposal" consists of "the 
discharge . . . or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste 
into or on any land or water."  42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis 
added).  There is no exception for de minimis disturbances.  Cf.United 
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 
1992) ("[C]ourts that have addressed this issue [whether the term 
"hazardous substance" includes any quantitative requirement] have 
almost uniformly held that CERCLA liability does not depend on 
the existence of a threshold quantity of a hazardous 
substance.").  The fact that a defendant's dispersal of 
contaminants is trivial may provide a ground to allocate less 
liability to that defendant, but it is not a defense to 
liability. 
 
                         B. The Evidence 
     The evidence presented by both parties shows that a genuine 
issue of material fact remains as to whether Dowel's drilling 
caused the dispersal of contaminants.  HMAT presented the 
drilling logs and report of Thor Engineering, the firm that 
performed Dowel's soil test.  According to these documents, Thor 
made nine drill borings twelve to eighteen feet into the ground 
and extracted columns of soil for study.  The drill bored through 
garbage, miscellaneous fill from the dump, cinders, a black 
substance that appeared to be petroleum-based, and ground water.  
The documents show that al least three of the holes "caved" 
during drilling.  App. 120.  
     HMAT also submitted an affidavit from Laura Truettner, an 
expert environmental consultant, which asserted that Dowel's 
drilling spread contamination.  First, because Thor's logs show 
that the drill encountered waste materials, natural soil, and 
groundwater, and that several boreholes "caved," Truettner 
concludes that mixing of these materials occurred.  Second, 
Thor's report and logs show no evidence that the drilling 
equipment was decontaminated between boreholes and before the 
equipment was moved from the landfill.  Thus, Truettner 
maintains, it is probable that contaminated material was spread 
between boreholes and along roads used for access by the drilling 
equipment. 
     Dowel, in response, submitted an affidavit from Peter 
Wilner, the principal of Thor Engineering.  Wilner states that he 
personally directed and oversaw the drilling at issue.  He 
asserts that "no drills were used; no 'cuttings' were generated; 
no soils or other materials were in any way spread around the 
premises; and no holes were left open, allowing for any 
infiltration of foreign materials."  He also claims that "The 
'open' boring method used for the . . . borings performed at the 
Premises does not cause the underground mixing or shifting of 
subsurface materials." 
     HMAT then submitted another affidavit from Truettner.  
Truettner contends that Wilner's affidavit contains misleading 
statements and directly contradicts the contemporaneous record of 
the drilling.  She first casts doubt on Wilner's claim that he 
was present during the drilling, pointing out that the drilling 
logs indicate the presence of several people but make no mention 
of Wilner.  She represents that it is industry practice to list 
all representatives at the site during the drilling. 
     Truettner then states that, although Wilner's statement that 
no drills were used is technically correct because a "split spoon 
sampler" was used, the distinction is irrelevant:  materials were 
disturbed and a hole was created.  According to Truettner, "anytype of 
sampling activity generates cuttings because the split 
spoon sampler knocks material off the borehole walls." 
     Furthermore, Truettner attacks the implications of Wilner's 
statement that no holes were left open.  According to Truettner, 
in order for the holes to have been closed one of three things 
would have had to occur:  (1) the holes were filled with material 
brought from off-site; (2) they were filled with material from 
the site itself; or (3) they were allowed to collapse in on 
themselves.  Truettner contends that the first scenario is 
unlikely in light of the documentary evidence:  the cost estimate 
of the drilling does not reflect the costs of fill material and 
labor.  And, if either of the other two scenarios occurred, the 
act of filling the holes would cause mixing of materials on the 
property. 
     Finally, Truettner asserts that Wilner's statement that 
Thor's boring method does not cause mixing of subsurface of 
material is contradicted by the drilling logs, which show that at 
least three of the holes "caved."  "The process of caving," 
Truettner states, "will absolutely cause the mixing and shifting 
of subsurface materials." 
     Given this evidence, a genuine dispute remains as to whether 
Dowel's drilling caused the dispersal of contaminants.  A factual 
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable 
factfinder could find in favor the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  HMAT's evidence 
that Thor's equipment went through waste, soil, and groundwater 
and that several boreholes "caved", in combination with its 
expert's opinion, is sufficient to support a finding that a 
dispersal of contaminants occurred.  Dowel's evidence, that 
despite the contact between its equipment, waste, soil, and 
groundwater, its boring method caused no mixing, is sufficient to 
support the opposite finding.  Thus summary judgment in favor of 
either party is inappropriate. 
 
                      C. Soil Investigation 
     As we have explained, HMAT has identified evidence from 
which a factfinder could conclude that Dowel has caused a 
dispersal of contaminants.  Ordinarily, that would be sufficient 
to submit the question of whether a "disposal" occurred to a 
factfinder.  However, this is not an ordinary case:  the alleged 
act of disposal consists of a soil investigation, and CERCLA 
clearly contemplates that some soil investigation be allowed to 
examine contaminated property.  Thus, it is not enough for a 
plaintiff to show that a soil investigation has caused the spread 
of contaminants.  Rather, we conclude that in order to establish 
that "disposal" has occurred based on a soil investigation, a 
plaintiff must also show that the investigation was conducted 
negligently. 
     CERCLA's innocent owner defense encourages prospective 
property buyers to conduct soil investigations.  The innocent 
owner defense requires, inter alia, that "[a]t the time the 
defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and 
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the 
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, 
in, or at the facility."  42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (emphasis 
added).  CERCLA provides explicit guidance on how a defendant is 
to establish that it had "no reason to know" of a prior disposal: 
          To establish that the defendant had no reason to 
     know . . . the defendant must have undertaken, at the 
     time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the 
     previous ownership and uses of the property consistent 
     with good commercial or customary practice in an effort 
     to minimize liability.  For purposes of the preceding 
     sentence the court shall take into account any 
     specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the 
     defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to 
     the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly 
     known or reasonably ascertainable information about the 
     property, the obviousness of the presence or likely 
     presence of contamination at the property, and the 
     ability to detect such contamination by appropriate 
     inspection. 
Id. § 9601(35)(b).  CERCLA thus contemplates that prospective 
purchasers "undertake[] . . . all appropriate inquiry" and will 
engage in "appropriate inspection." 
     In order to give effect to the innocent owner defense and 
its requirement that prospective purchasers engage in appropriate 
inquiry and inspection, an "appropriate" soil investigation 
cannot itself trigger CERCLA liability.  Otherwise, prospective 
purchasers who by diligently inspecting for contamination cause 
the dispersal of any contaminants will find themselves liable for 
causing a "disposal."  And the innocent owner defense would offer 
such prospective purchasers no protection:  if they buy the 
property after discovering contamination, they will be ineligible 
for the defense because they will not be "innocent" (i.e., they 
will "know and ha[ve] reason to know" of a prior disposal, id. § 
9601(35)); if they do not buy the property, they will be 
ineligible for the defense because they will not be "owners" 
(i.e., they will not have "acquired the facility" as required by 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)).  In order to give the defense effect, 
then, an "appropriate" soil investigation cannot constitute 
disposal.   
     But a party cannot escape liability for performing a soil 
investigation negligently and thereby unnecessarily spreading 
pollution.  Several CERCLA provisions suggest that persons 
otherwise insulated from CERCLA liability may nonetheless become 
liable if they act negligently.  In order to take advantage of a 
third-party defense (i.e., that a release was caused solely by a 
third party), a defendant must show that "he exercised due care 
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into 
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in 
light of all relevant facts and circumstances."  42 U.S.C. § 
9607(b)(3)(a).  And another provision, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1), 
insulates from liability actions consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan unless they are negligently performed: 
     [N]o person shall be liable under this subchapter for 
     costs or damages as a result of rendering care, 
     assistance, or advice in accordance with the National 
     Contingency Plan ("NCP") or at the direction of an 
     onscene coordinator appointed under such a plan, with 
     respect to an incident creating a danger to public 
     health or welfare or the environment as a result of any 
     releases of a hazardous substance or threat thereof.  
     This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs 
     or damages as the result of negligence on the part of 
     such person. 
42 U.S.C. § 9697(D)(1).  These provisions are themselves 
inapplicable to the issue at hand.  However, they express a 
useful principle for determining when an action that is exempted 
from liability becomes so inconsistent with CERCLA's purposes 
that it is no longer so insulated, and this informs our judgment.  
We conclude that only "appropriate" soil investigations -- i.e., 
those that do not negligently spread contamination -- fall 
outside the definition of "disposal."  Such a rule best 
harmonizes CERCLA's clear intention to allow soil investigations 
and its goal of remedying hazardous waste sites. 
     We recognize that the soil investigation at issue here was 
not meant to discover the presence of contamination but was aimed 
at assessing the land's ability to support construction.  
However, we conclude that the purpose of the investigation is 
irrelevant.  Determining the motive of the investigating party 
seems a costly and difficult inquiry.  Moreover, we do not wish 
to deter the productive use of property by discouraging soil 
investigations aimed at assessing development possibilities.  
     In addition to applying the wrong test of "disposal," the 
district court did not focus on whether Dowel's soil testing was 
negligently performed, and we believe that the parties should 
have a chance to add to the record on this issue.  Therefore, we 
will vacate the district court's order dismissing HMAT's CERCLA 
claim and remand for further proceedings. 
 
                          IV. Conclusion 
     For the foregoing reasons, the passive spreading of 
contamination in a landfill does not constitute "disposal" under 
CERCLA.  Soil testing that disperses contaminants, however, may 
constitute "disposal" and HMAT has identified evidence that would 
justify a factfinder's conclusion that contaminants were 
dispersed in Dowel's testing.  Nevertheless, because CERCLA 
contemplates that some soil investigation be allowed, HMAT must 
show not only that the soil investigation caused the spread of 
contaminants but also that the investigation was conducted 
negligently.  The judgment of the district court will therefore 
be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
                                    
